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On June I, 1969, Sherman Skolnick, chairman of the Citizens' Committee To
Clean Up The Courts, filed a motion in the Illinois Supreme Court asking the court
to investigate the integrity of its decision in People v. Isaacs The motion charged
Chief Justice Roy J. Solfisburg Jr. and Justice Ray I. Klingbiel with "undue influence
and appearance of impropriety" regarding the Isaacs decision and alleged specifically
that Justice Klingbiel had received a gift of one hundred shares of bank stock from
the defendant while the case was pending before the court. Both justices had voted
with the 4-2 majority to affirm the trial court's dismissal of an indictment against
Isaacs, and Klingbiel wrote the opinion.
Since June 1964 the power to remove Illinois judges for misconduct has been in
the Illinois Courts Commission, an agency consisting of five judges, which at the
time of Skolnick's motion was not permanently in session but was convened by the
Supreme Court on a case-by-case basis.2 In a public statement a week after the motion
was filed, the court described its dilemma in trying to decide whether to convene the
Commission to investigate the allegations of misconduct against Chief Justice Solfisburg and Justice Klingbiel:
Of paramount importance was the fact that the confidence of the bar and the
public in the integrity of this Court not be further impaired. It seemed to the Court
that an investigation by the Illinois Courts Commission might be viewed with some
skepticism. The investigating agency for that Commission is the Administrative
Director of the Illinois Courts, who is appointed by, and subject to the directions of
this Court, a circumstance which might raise questions.
Secondly,... Mr. Justice Klingbiel is presently and has been for several years,
chairman of the Commission. While another member of this Court could have
replaced Mr. Justice Klingbiel, this would not eliminate the problem arising from
the fact that a member of this Court-a colleague of those as to whose conduct
questions have been raised-was chairing the investigating body. This, again,
seemed likely to be viewed with some skepticism, particularly when considered
with the fact that this Court also appoints the two circuit judges who serve on the
Commission.
*The research on which this article is based was supported by the American Bar Foundation but the
article is entirely the responsibility of the author.
"-'B.A. 1961, Virginia Military Institute; J.D. z964, Washington and Lee University; Research
Attorney, American Bar Foundation.
1 37 111.2d 205, 226 N.E.2d 38 (1967).
' Shortly after Skolnick's motion was filed, ILL. Sup. CT. R. 51 (Smith-Hurd x969), which governs the
procedure of the Commission, was amended to provide that the Commission would be convened on a
permanent basis.
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The course of action the court chose was appointment of an ad hoc group of five
lawyers formally designated "The Special Commission in Relation to No. 39797"
(docket number of the Isaacs case). The court gave the special commission plenary
procedural powers and directed it to file its report by August i, 1969. After extensive
preliminary investigation, the commission held six days of public hearings in July
during which it took testimony from twenty-one witnesses, including Chief Justice
Solfisburg, Justice Klingbiel, and Theodore Isaacs, all of whom were represented by
counsel.
In its report to the court,8 the special commission found that both judges had had
business dealings with Isaacs while his case was pending before the court. The commission found the judges guilty not only of conduct creating a "substantial and
pervasive" appearanceof impropriety but also of "certain positive acts of impropriety"
(emphasis in original). The commission concluded that "the confidence of the public
and the Bar in the Court ...has been severely shaken by the facts disclosed in this
record" and suggested the judges resign.4
It is uncertain what could have been done if the judges had refused this suggestion.
The court's public statement that an investigation by the Illinois Courts Commission would be "viewed with some skepticism" was surely accurate, and the decision
to appoint an ad hoc group of lawyers was therefore probably the best if indeed not
the only course available, as far as finding the facts was concerned. But that is all
the special commission was authorized to do: the only agency that is constitutionally
empowered actually to remove a judge is the Courts Commission, which the Supreme
Court had disqualified. Fortunately, on August 2, 1969, two days after the special
commission submitted its report, both judges did resign.
Fortunately, too, the Solfisburg-Klingbiel controversy is not the typical case of
judicial misconduct. For one thing, cases in which termination of a judge's service
is warranted are few; for another, such cases occur on appellate courts only infrequently. The more usual problems are less dramatic-habitual tardiness, short
hours, long vacations, undignified courtroom behavior, arbitrary use of court powers,
and extreme rudeness to lawyers, litigants, and witnesses. Examples:
-The judge who at a conference in chambers told a lawyer who refused to
stipulate the amount of property damages in a tort case, "I'm going to screw you
every way I can short of reversible error."
-The judge who questioned two Puerto Ricans charged with assault and
robbery just long enough to learn they could not understand English, then without further ado sentenced both to ninety days in jail.
-The judge who after a cab driver charged with drunk driving testified he
8
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS IN THE MATTER OF =11
SPEcAL COMMISSION IN RwAnoN TO No. 39797 (PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, APPELLANT V.
THEODORE J. IeS, ET AL., APPELLEE) Guly 31, 1969).
'Id. at 51-53, 6i.
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stopped at a barbecue stand just before the accident entertained the courtroom
with a knowing smirk and the question, "Did you have the strong sauce?"
, just understand this: I
-The judge who told a plaintiff's lawyer: "Mr.
don't want to hear the reasons for objections. If I need your reasons I will ask
for them. Your objection is overruled on every conceivable ground available to
you. '
-The probate judge who appointed his wife as appraiser of an estate in his
court.
-The judge who in the midst of a busy trial season left for two weeks vacation
in Florida without telling his administrative judge.
Although the fact situation in the Solfisburg-Klingbiel controversy was unusual,
the policy question it presented is common to every case of judicial misconduct and
central to discussion of how to deal with the problem: who has or should have the
authority to regulate judicial behavior? Or, to put the analytically precedent question, what is the reason for regulating judicial behavior? It is the thesis here that
the principal policy objective of a procedure for dealing with judicial misconduct
as such-as distinguished from a procedure for dealing with the effects of the misconduct on the judgment in a particular case (which seems to me clearly the responsibility of the appellate process)-is to insure society's confidence in the formal system
of dispute-resolution.
Broadly speaking, there are only two places to put the power to deal with judicial
i.e., in the legislature or the
misconduct, either in the judiciary itself or outside it,
executive. A basic difficulty with putting the power in the judiciary is the political
fact stated forthrightly by the Illinois Supreme Court's Justice Schaefer in Cusack v.
Howlett, decided a few months after the Solfisburg-Klingbiel matter: "There is a
latent distrust of the ability or willingness of the group of men who at any moment
constitute one branch of government so to order the affairs of that branch as to
satisfy legitimate public concern." 5 On the other hand, putting the power outside
the judiciary presents, as Justice Schaefer also pointed out, "the perennial problem
of the independence of the judiciary from legislative or executive domination."6
The principal traditional procedures-impeachment, address, and concurrent resolution-put the removal power in the legislature Evidence on the effectiveness and
5 44 III. 2d 233, -', 254 N.E.2d 506, 509 (1969).
a 44 Il1. 2d at -, 254 N.E.2d at 508.
7Impeachment, which exists in 46 states and the federal system, is a legislative proceeding in which
the lower house acts as grand jury and the upper house as trial court. Address (28 states) is a formal
request from the legislature to the governor asking him to remove a judge. Concurrent resolution is a
variant form of address; if a certain percentage of both legislative houses votes to request that the governor
remove a judge, he is legally obliged to do so. Another traditional procedure, recall, exists in only seven
states. It is analogous to initiative and referendum; if a certain percentage of the voters sign a petition
to recall a judge, he must face a special election. These procedures are further described, and constitutional
and statutory citations to the law in all American jurisdictions are provided, in Am. JuD. Soc'y, JuDiciA.L
DIsCIPLINE AND RaMOVAL (Report No. 5, August 1969).
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use of these procedures is scant, but the evidence available indicates they have been
little used.' The research on which this paper is based, though not exhaustive, found
only five states that have used impeachment against judges within the last fifteen
years,' and no instance of the use of address, concurrent resolution, or recall (which
exists in only seven states) within the last three decades.
Impeachment is the best-known and most widely available of the traditional
procedures; it exists in forty-six states and the federal system. The main criticisms of
impeachment have been that it is procedurally cumbersome and susceptible to partisan
political influences. Since the forum of decision is the legislature and legislators are
partisan advocates by civic obligation and practical necessity, the latter criticism seems
justified. The charge of procedural cumbersomeness, however, is not borne out
by the experience of Missouri, one of the five states included in the research upon
which this article is based1" and one of the few states that has used impeachment in
recent years."
In March 1963, five days before his scheduled impeachment trial on seventeen
artides of misconduct, St. Louis County Circuit Court Judge Virgil A. Poelker
resigned. Most of the charges were based upon the judge's tangled financial dealings;
he apparently had over-extended himself and then got into a cycle of borrowing from
one creditor to pay another. Although Judge Poelker's misconduct began coming to
light in the spring of I96i, evidence sufficient to impeach him was not available until
later that year, by which time the Missouri legislature was no longer in session. In
January 1963, when the legislature met again for its regular biennial session, it
promptly initiated impeachment proceedings.
Another judge of the same court, John D. Hasler, resigned in August x968, three
days before his scheduled impeachment trial on misconduct charges arising from his
personal involvement with a woman divorce defendant in his court. He had previously been convicted by a jury of official misconduct (a misdemeanor) as a result
of the same circumstances.
Insofar as it implies that impeachment intrinsically cannot operate expeditiously,
the criticism that impeachment is procedurally clumsy is not borne out by the
Poelker and Hasler cases. In both cases the proceedings, once begun, went forward
See, e.g., Shartel, Retirement and Removal of Judges, 2o J. Am. JUD. SOc'Y 133, 151 n.86 (936),
reporting two judges removed by impeachment and three by address in the period 19ooa; Miller,
Discipline of Judges, 50 MicH. L. REv. 737 (x952), reporting three impeachments of judges-and all
three judges acquitted-in the period x928-48; and Brand, The Discipline of Judges, 46 A.B.A.J. 1315
n.2 (ig6o), reporting ig removals and three resignations as a result of impeachment proceedings "as far
back as can be recalled or determined" in 40 of 45 states surveyed.
9
Alabama, Florida, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Tennessee.
" Besides conventional legal materials, the research sources included public and private records and
interviews with trial lawyers, judges, court administrative personnel, newspaper reporters, and others
in a position to have direct knowledge of the problem. Five states were studied: Missouri, New Jersey,
New York, California, and Illinois.
" Both the Missouri impeachments referred to here are described in detail in Braithwaite, Removal
and Retirement of Judges in Missouri: A Field Study, 1968 WgAsH. U.L.Q. 378.
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with reasonable dispatch. In the Poelker matter, about two and a half months
elapsed between the House's adoption of a resolution initiating an investigation and
the date of the impeachment trial. In Hasler's case, slightly less than six months
elapsed between the initial House resolution and the impeachment trial date; by
comparison, the criminal proceedings took about four months.
Missouri's experience has been that the most serious deficiency of impeachment
is not procedural clumsiness but the cost of the proceedings-64,ooo for Poelker,
S2o,ooo for Hasler-and the extraordinary political pressure required to trigger the
procedure initially. In the Poelker case, the extent of the judge's loose financial
dealings and other misconduct, a state-wide sense of outrage resulting from widespread publicity about the case, the eighteen-month delay before action to remove him
could finally be taken (because the legislature was not in session), and his refusal
to resign all combined to create intense pressure on the legislature to act when it
convened in January 1963 for its biennial session. In the Hasler matter, the nature
of the judge's misconduct was the principal factor producing the same kind of
pressure, although the reaction time was considerably shortened-not surprisingly,
in view of the still recent memory of the Poelker controversy, which the newspapers
naturally revived.
Whatever the reason that impeachment and the other traditional procedures have
fallen into disuse (it seems fair to infer that at least some states think the traditional
procedures ineffective), they are today being superseded by one or the other of
several "modern" procedures. Between i96o and i97o, over twenty-five states adopted
by constitutional amendment, legislation, or court rule new procedures to deal with
judicial misconduct. By comparison with the traditional procedures, the most notable
feature the modern procedures have in common is that they put the power of final
decision in the judiciary itself, either in the state supreme court or in a court constituted specially to hear and decide cases of judicial misconduct.
The prototype of the first arrangement is the procedure of California's Commission
on Judicial Qualifications; of the second, the procedure of New York's Court on the
Judiciary. The California Commission is a nine-member agency (five judges, two
lawyers, two laymen) with its own independent staff; it is authorized to receive
and investigate complaints, hold confidential fact-finding hearings, and recommend
appropriate action to the state supreme court, which alone has the power actually
to remove or censure a judge. The New York Court consists of six judges but exists
permanently only on paper, the members for a particular case being appointed on an
ad hoc basis. Unlike the California procedure, the New York Court has no hearing
agency and no permanent staff of its own.
Both the California and the New York prototypes have been copied in other
states, the former in twelve, the latter in five. 12 There are also variations of both
"2 Depending upon which features of a particular procedure are taken as its defining characteristics,
an estimate of the number of states that have adopted that procedure will vary. The estimates here are
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prototypes. In New Jersey, for example, as in California, it is the state supreme
court that has the power actually to remove or discipline a judge. But the New Jersey
procedure does not include a separate hearing agency; instead, on an ad hoc basis,
the court sometimes appoints a single judge as master or referee to hold in camera
hearings, find the facts, and report to the court2aa Nor does the New Jersey procedure include an independent staff; the state court administrator serves this function.
The Illinois Courts Commission resembles the New York Court on the Judiciary
in that it is a court specially constituted to decide cases of judicial misconduct3P
Another similarity is that both agencies lack a hearing agency. Unlike the New York
Court, however, the Illinois Commission does have a staff-the state court administrator, as in New Jersey.
The research on which this paper is based included a detailed study of the
removal-discipline procedures in these four states-New Jersey, New York, California, and Illinois. The immediate objective was to learn how some of the principal
modern procedures actually operate. A more general objective was to identify the
functional similarities and differences among procedures, with a view to suggesting
which features recommend themselves for imitation and which for eschewal.
II
In the past fifteen years, the New Jersey Supreme Court has dealt in formal,
reported disciplinary proceedings with eight cases of judicial misconduct. At least
that many more cases during the same period have been handled informally and off
the record. The reported cases include ticket-fixing,14 income tax evasion,1 violation
of court rules limiting the practice of law by lawyer-magistrates, "0 and violation of
customs and court rules relating to maintenance of order and decorum in the courtroom.1 7 Among the incidents handled informally are drinking, submitting false
statistical reports on court workload, practicing law while a judge,7 and habitually
failing to follow prescribed procedures in handling criminal casesy a
based principally upon who has the decision-making power-the state supreme court or a specially constituted2 court See generally Report No. 5, supra note 7, at n.7.
" 'Under the procedure prescribed by a statute approved and effective July 24, 197o, evidence in
judicial removal-discipline proceedings may be taken either before the Supreme Court en bane or before
three judges designated by the Chief Justice. N.J. Laws 1970, ch. 151.
"The Illinois Courts Commission is an example of the confusing names some removal-discipline agencies
have. Though called a "commission," the Illinois agency is in fact a court, since it has power to make
a final decision and render a judgment on the merits, that is, to remove or discipline a judge. California's
Commission on Judicial Qualifications, by contrast, does not have such powers.
"'In re Orsini, 37 N.J. 500, i81 A.2d 771 (1962).
"I1n re Gurnik, 45 N.J. 115 , 2x A.2d 777 (1965).
" In re Klaisz, i9 NJ. 145, xx5 A.2d 537 (1955); In re Palmisano, x8 N.J. 497, 1X4 A.2d 553 (x955).
"'In re Stevens, 2o N.J. Z17, i9

A.2d 9 (1955).

1 Since the research for this article was completed, there have been the following recent incidents of
judicial misconduct in New Jersey. Passaic County Court Judge Stanley Polack, upon being convicted
of income tax evasion, resigned from the bench. Union County District Court Judge Ralph Dc Vita, upon
being convicted of obstructing justice, resigned from the bench and the bar. Newark Municipal Court
Chief Magistrate James Del Mauro resigned after disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him on
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The New Jersey Supreme Court's authority to deal with judicial misconduct has
evolved principally from its constitutionally assigned "jurisdiction over admission to
the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted."'" Pursuant to this power
the court has made the Canons of Professional Ethics and the Canons of Judicial
Ethics legally binding on lawyers and judges in New Jersey' 9 And in a 1961 decision,
In re Mattera,2 ° the court construed its power to discipline members of the bar to
extend to lawyers in judicial office.
The court's ability to deal with judicial misconduct is facilitated by its plenary
power in the area of administration. By constitutional provision, the court is directed
to "make rules governing the administration of all courts."2' The extent and diversity
of the court's administrative rules make evident that it exercises this power with
vigor and decision. 2 The constitution also makes the Chief Justice "administrative
head of all the courts" and gives him authority to "appoint an Administrative
Director to serve at his pleasure." 23 The statute prescribing the Administrative
Director's functions is both specific and comprehensive 4 In addition to his statutorily prescribed duties, the Administrative Director is also the staff for the Supreme
Court in its capacity as removal-discipline agency.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's authority to administer the court system and
discipline lawyers and judges originated in 1947 with the adoption of the present
constitution. The judicial article of this constitution completely reorganized the
state's court system, which until then had remained basically unchanged since 1844. It
was a system with a hundred years' accretion of antique habits and legislative patches,
characterized by a labyrinthine court structure and an utter absence of administrative
direction and authority. 5
It was the intention of the drafters of the new judicial article that judicial misconduct be dealt with directly by the Supreme Court. The article provided that
"The Judges of the Superior Court and the Judges of the County Courts shall also
[in addition to being subject to impeachment] be subject to removal from office
by the Supreme Court for such causes and in such manner as shall be provided by
the grounds he violated a Supreme Court directive forbidding acceptance of fees or gratuities for
performing marriages. Letter from New Jersey Supreme Court Chief justice Joseph Weintraub to Robert
NV. Meserve, Sept. 16, 1970 (quoted with permission).
8
N.J. CoNsir. art. VI, § 2, 3.
'0 N.J. Sup. Cr. R. 1:14.
20 34 N.J. 259, 168 A.2d 38 (I96i).
"1 N.J. CoNsr. art. VI, § 2, 3.
" See generally N.J. Sup. CT. R. pt. 1, ch. IV ("Administration"); McConnell, The Administrative
Offlce of the Courts of New Jersey, X4 RuTGERs L. Rav. 29o (196o).
52
N.J. Co~sr. art. VI, § 7, i.
'N.J. REv. STAT. 2A:I2-3 (1965).
5
Some discussion of New Jersey's old (pre-1947) court system and the reform movement leading
to its abolition and replacement by the present system can be found in Evans, ConstitutionalCourt Reform
in New Jersey, 7 U. NawAuc L. Rav. x (X941); Harrison, New Jersey's New Court System, 2 RuTGERs
L. Rav. 6o (1948); Hartshorne, Progress in New Jersey judicial Administration, 3 RuTGERS L. REV. 161
(1949); and Milmed, The New Jersey Constitution of z947, N.J. STAT. ANN. (Const. vol.) at xiii (West
1954).
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law."2

More than two decades elapsed, however, before the legislature finally, in
April 1970, adopted a statute implementing this grant of power to the Supreme Court.
Whatever the reason for the legislative delay, it left the Supreme Court, until
adoption of the 1970 statute, with the responsibility but not the power to deal with
judicial misconduct. One solution to this dilemma lay in a careful reading of the
judicial article provision requiring implementing legislation. While it was clear that
without legislation the court could not remove a judge, nothing forbade the court
actively to encourage a misbehaving judge to remove himself, that is, to resign or
retire. Confronted with substantiated reports of a judge's heavy drinking, Chief
Justice Vanderbilt personally suggested to the judge that he ought to retire. The
judge did. Anoher case, involving falsification of statistical reports of court workload, was handled the same way, with a similar result.
In the twenty-year period ending in 1968, at least eight incidents of serious judicial
misconduct have been handled in this manner by either Vanderbilt or his successor,
the present Chief Justice. Not all resulted in the judges' termination of service,
however. In several cases, the judge has been disciplined by reprimand or admonition in a private hearing before the Supreme Court en banc or, occasionally, the
Chief Justice alone. All these proceedings have been off the record.
Some other cases have resulted in reported court decisions, the first of which
occurred in 1955,27 eight years after the new judicial article became effective. Then,
in I961, the court decided In re Mattera, holding that the court's constitutionally
assigned disciplinary power over persons admitted to the bar extended to lawyers
in judicial office, and thus by implication holding also that disbarment or similar
discipline could be imposed upon a judge. The theory of the court's decision was this:
In terms of rational connection with fitness at the bar, behavior of an attorney
in judicial office cannot be insulated from the demands of professional ethics. On
the contrary, the judge's role is so intimate a part of the process of justice that
misbehavior as a judge must inevitably reflect upon qualification for membership
at the bar. s
The procedural pattern for the court's handling of judicial misconduct cases is
now well established? Complaints are received, screened, and preliminarily investigated by the Administrative Director of the Courts. If his report substantiates the
allegations, the court orders the respondent judge to show cause why he should not
be held in contempt, disbarred, or otherwise disciplined. Depending upon the nature
and complexity of the case, the court may hear argument on the show-cause order
§ 6, 4 (emphasis added).
n re Palmisano, z8 N.J. 497, 1X4 A.2d 553 (x955); In re Klaisz, i9 NJ. 145, 115 A.2d 537 (1955);

" N.J. CONsr. art. VI,
27

In re Stevens, 2o N.J. 177, 119 A.2d 9 (1955).
28 34 N.J. 259, 264, 168 A.2d 38, 41 (196r).
2'Reported cases decided subsequent to Mattera are In re Orsini, 37 N.J. Soo, x~z A.2d 77x (x962);
In re Pagliughi, 39 N.J. 517, 189 A.2d 218 (1963); In re Hayden, 41 N.J. 443, 197 A.2d 353 (1964);
In re Gurnik, 45 N.J. 115, 211 A.2d 777 (x965).
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without further proceedings, or it may, as it did in Mattera,appoint a judge to make
formal fact-findings and a report before it hears argument. Throughout, both sides
are represented by counsel, the court appointing a lawyer on an ad hoc basis to
prosecute the case, occasionally someone from the state attorney general's office 2a
The procedure in those cases handled off the record is similar, except that it is

sometimes less formal. The Administrative Office is still the investigative agency, but
all proceedings are confidential and any hearing is in camera before the court en
banc or, occasionally, the Chief Justice alone. If the court decides that the misconduct warrants termination of the judge's service, it asks him to resign or retire,
and the case is closed when he does so. The option of a full-dress adversary proceeding is open to a judge who wishes to contest the allegations against him.
III
While New York has a battery of removal procedures-five in all'°-only the
best-known will be discussed here. That is the Court on the Judiciary, prototype of
those modern procedures in which power to remove is put in a specially constituted
court rather than in the state supreme court.
Created by constitutional amendment adopted in 1947, the Court on the Judiciary
is empowered to remove "for cause" any judge of the five major trial courts or the
Court of Appeals, which is the highest appellate court 1 The six members of the
Court on the Judiciary are the Chief Judge and senior associate judge of the Court
of Appeals and one judge from the Appellate Division in each of the four "depart-

ments" into which the state is divided for court administration purposes (the Appellate
Division is New York's intermediate appellate court).

The Court's powers-to summon witnesses, take evidence, and so on-and the
respondents rights-notice, opportunity to be heard, and so on-are the usual ones.
But the procedure for setting the Court in motion is somewhat curious, as is the
provision which allows legislative pre-emption of removal proceedings once fhey
are begun. The Court is not a continuing body but is convened on a case-by-case
basis by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals. He may act on his own motion,
but he is required to convene the Court upon the written request of the governor,
"' "The Attorney General or his representative shall prosecute the proceedings unless the Supreme
Court shall specially designate an attorney for that purpose." N.J. Laws x970, ch. 151.
" Impeachment, N.Y. CONsr. art. VI, § 25, has existed in New York since 1777 and has been used
once, in 1872 (judge removed), 4 C. LINCOLN, CoNsTrru

oNL. HisroRY oF NEw Yoasc 6o5 (z9o6).

Removal by concurrent resolution of the two houses of the legislature, N.Y. CoNsr. art. VI, § 23a, has
never been used. The procedure whereby a judge can be removed "for cause" by two-thirds vote of the
senate upon recommendation of the governor has been used four times, once in 1866 (judge acquitted),
twice in 1872 (one judge removed, the other acquitted), and most recently in 1939 (judge acquitted),
4 LINCOLN, supra, at 585. The Appellate Division, which is the intermediate appellate court, is authorized
to remove judges of lower courts. N.Y. CoNsr. art. VI, § 22i. This procedure is described in detail in my
forthcoming monograph on removal and retirement of judges.
" N.Y. CoNsir. art. VI, §22. The five major trial courts are the Supreme Court, which has state-wide
general jurisdiction, and four courts with state-wide limited jurisdiction: the Court of Claims, Surrogate's
Court, County Court, and Family Court.
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any one of the four Presiding Justices of the Appellate Division, or a majority of
the executive committee of the state bar association.
Once charges are preferred, regardless who initiates the convening, the Chief
Judge, as "presiding officer" of the Court, is required, before hearing, to give written
notice of the judge's name, the nature of the charges, and the hearing date to the
Governor, President of the Senate, and Speaker of the Assembly. If any member of
the legislature prefers the same charges against the judge within thirty days of this
notice and "such charges are entertained by a majority vote of the assembly, proceedings before the court on the judiciary shall be stayed pending the determination
of the legislature, which shall be exclusive and final.""2
The Court has been convened three times since I947.Pa The first case involved two
Brooklyn judges, Nathan R. Sobel and Samuel S. Leibowitz, who used the press as a
forum for statements critical of each other's official conduct in connection with a
much-publicized murder trial. Judge Sobel made a statement implying that Judge
Leibowitz had knowingly participated in the prosecution of an innocent fifteen-year,old boy; Judge Leibowitz responded that Judge Sobel should "keep his filthy mouth
shut." Two weeks after the exchange of statements, the Chief Judge of the Court
of Appeals appointed two judges as a committee to investigate the incident. As a
result of the committee's report, the State Judicial Conference adopted a resolution
finding that the two judges had "abused their public offices" and "rebuked and reprimanded" them.
After receiving a copy of the resolution and a transcript of the testimony taken
by the investigating committee, the Chief Judge convened the Court on the Judiciary.
At its first meeting, the Court adopted procedural rules and appointed two lawyers
to conduct the proceedings. The charges prepared by the lawyers alleged that the
judges' statements "violated the concept, spirit and letter of the canons of judicial
ethics," offended "judicial decorum and propriety," and brought "into disrepute the
administration of justice in Kings County."
Both judges' counsel moved to dismiss the proceedings on the grounds that the
charges did not as a matter of law constitute "cause" for removal. In a brief per
curiam opinion announced July 8, i96o, the Court held that the charges were legally
sufficient (and denied the motions to dismiss) but also that the facts in the case did
not justify removal. Although the opinion did not explicitly censure the judges, it
was strongly condemnatory of their actions3 4
82

N.Y. CoNsr. art. VI, § 22b.

S3 The following accounts of the Court on the Judiciary's three cases are based entirely upon official

records in the custody of the Clerk of the New York Court of Appeals.
54
The court said in part: "We hold that the conduct of each respondent was wrongful. Judge Sobel's
fault was in making il-considered and unfounded accusations or suggestions that a criminal case had
been unfairly prosecuted. Judge Leibowitz offended against judicial decorum and dignity by using a
courtroom as a forum for vilification of a fellow jurist. . . . Such personal altercation, among Judges
are indefensible. It is a disservice to the courts .... It is an affront to the State and its citizens. The
In re Sobel, In re Leibowitz, 8 N.Y.2d at (a)
public had a right to be indignant at such a display...
(Court on the Judiciary 196o).
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The Court was convened for the second time a little more than two years later.
Second Department Appellate Division Presiding Justice George J. Beldock requested
that the Court be convened to consider the conduct of Judge Louis L. Friedman in
refusing to produce certain records subpoenaed in an investigation of Brooklyn
lawyers' solicitation of personal-injury lawsuits.
The rules adopted by the Court in the Friedman case were identical to those
adopted in the Sobel-Leibowitz controversy except that Rule I was amended to
provide that four members rather than five would constitute a quorum. The charges
served by the two lawyers appointed to conduct the proceedings alleged that Judge
Friedman had "abused his public office" in three particulars: (x) by interfering with
and obstructing the investigation; (2) by maintaining exclusive possession of the
records of his former law partnership with his brother Malcolm and refusing to
account to Malcolm for the records; (3) by failing to observe the "concept, spirit
and letter of the canons of judicial ethics."
After motions and other preliminary proceedings, the Court heard final oral
argument, then, on February 26, 1963, two members dissenting, announced its decision
finding Judge Friedman guilty of the charges and removing him from office 5
The Court on the judiciary's third case involved Judge Melvin H. Osterman of
the Court of Claims. In April 1963, Judge Osterman voluntarily appeared before
a New York County (Manhattan) grand jury investigating an alleged conspiracy
to bribe an official of the State Liquor Authority. At the hearing, Chief Assistant
District Attorney Alfred J. Scotti asked Judge Osterman to sign a general waiver of
immunity from subsequent criminal prosecution. The judge refused to sign a
general waiver but offered Scotti an already signed waiver limited to matters involving performance of his official judicial duties. Scotti declined to accept the limited
waiver, and the judge was excused and did not testify.
Subsequently, in response to a request from the governor, the Court on the Judiciary
was convened. The preliminary proceedings followed the pattern established in the
Sobel-Leibowitz and Friedman matters: adoption of rules; appointment of a clerk;
designation of counsel to conduct the proceedings; preparation of charges by counsel;
and a preliminary determination by the Court that the charges were legally sufficient.
Initially, four charges were brought against Judge Osterman,36 the principal
one being that he refused to co-operate with the grand jury by refusing to sign a
general waiver of immunity. The judge's answer admitted that he had refused to
N.Y.2d at (a) (Court on the Judiciary 1963), motion to vacate judgment denied,
id. at (e), appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 19 App. Div. 2d 120, 241 N.Y.S.2d 793 ( 3 d Dept.
1963), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question sub nom. Friedman v. Court on
the Judiciary, 375 U.S. 10 (1963).
"The charges alleged that Judge Osterman (i) had practiced law since becoming a judge by advising
certain persons in their dealings with the State Liquor Authority (SLA); (2) falsely denied to Chief
Assistant District Attorney Scotti that he had practiced law since becoming a judge; (3) refused to
co.operate with the grand jury investigation of the SLA by not signing a general waiver of immunity;
and (4) had attempted to obstruct the investigation by hiding a typewriter of evidentiary value.
"In re Friedman,
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sign a general waiver, and the lawyer designated to conduct the proceedings thereupon moved for judgment of removal on this ground alone. In granting the motion,

the Court said:
Public officers including judges may claim all the rights available to other
citizens, including the right to claim immunity and to refuse to waive it. It does
not follow, however, that a judge after successfully asserting such a right may claim
another right to remain in judicial office .... "Cause" for removal of a Judge may
be found not only in official misconduct but in his taking attitudes and positions
which show unfitness for the office and unworthiness of the trust. Such unfitness and
sworn to enforce law to
unworthiness is demonstrated by a refusal by a Judge
t
co-operate in any investigation of official corruption.

IV
California's removal-discipline mechanism is the prototype of the so-called "commission" procedure. The decision agency is the state Supreme Court, which may
remove or censure a judge for willful misconduct, willful and persistent failure to
perform his duties, habitual intemperance, or "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.""8
In practice very few cases actually reach the court. Nearly all are resolved
by the Commission on Judicial Qualifications, a hearing agency authorized to receive
and investigate complaints, hold hearings and make findings of fact, and recommend to the court that the court remove or censure a judge.
In its first nine years of operation (I9g6-69), the Commission received on average
one hundred complaints a year, of which about two-thirds usually were unfounded or
outside Commission jurisdiction. During this nine-year period, fifty judges resigned
or retired during Commission investigation of their performance or conduct (many of
these terminations of service were the consequence of disability rather than misconduct, however3 9).
The members of the Commission are five judges appointed by the Supreme Court,
two lawyers appointed by the state bar, and two lay citizens appointed by the
Governor with Senate approval. The Commission meets regularly about once every
two months, occasionally more often if necessary. A full-time Executive Secretary,
assisted by an office secretary, is responsible for day-to-day administrative operations
and the receiving, screening, and investigation of complaints. The Executive Secretary does most of the investigative work himself but sometimes employs outside
investigators; in a few major cases, the investigation has been done by the Bureau
re Osterman, 13 N.Y.2d at (a), (o), (p), (q) (Court on the Judiciary 1963).
8 CAL. CoNST. art. VI, § 18.
8TIn

8'The Commission is also the hearing agency in disability cases. Because Commission proceedings
and records are confidential by law, it is not known how many of the fifty terminations of service were
for misconduct and how many were for disability. Based upon the findings of research in other states
about the comparative incidence of these two types of problems, I surmise that between 5o% and 75%
of the total terminations in California were a consequence of disability.
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of Criminal Investigation and Intelligence, an agency of the California Department
of Justice.
Complaints come from various sources-litigants, lawyers, judges, public officials,
and bar associations. Overall, most complaints come from litigants, although the
actionable complaints come mostly from lawyers and judges. Litigants' complaints
are very often an attempt to use the Commission as a means to appeal an adverse
judgment. Such complaints, along with others that are prima fade frivolous or
unfounded, are acknowledged by the Executive Secretary with a letter explaining
why the Commission cannot act and are marked "Closed by Staff" without further
action. All complaints (including those closed by staff) and pending cases are
reviewed by the full Commission at its regular meetings.
Complaints that are prima facie valid are investigated by the Executive Secretary.
Although the Commission's procedural rules seem to require that a judge who is
the subject of a prima facie valid complaint be notified once an investigation
begins,4 ° the Commission does not in practice give such notice until it determines
through informal inquiry that a prima facie valid complaint does indeed have some
factual basis.
What approach the Commission takes once it determines a complaint has a factual
basis depends upon the case. Initially it may simply write the judge a letter saying
that an apparently valid complaint against him is on the Commission's agenda and
is being investigated. In cases of minor misconduct, such as tardiness or discourtesy,
where the facts are not complicated and the Executive Secretary's informal inquiry is
conclusive, the Commission often writes a "Staff Inquiry Letter" informally stating
the charges and requesting the judge's explanation. If the explanation is satisfactory,
the case is closed. Occasionally, closing the case is expressly conditioned upon the
cessation of certain conduct. Or the Commission may write the judge a letter of
admonition or reprimand. Sometimes, as the Executive Secretary has put it, "there
'
may be reason to accept the plea, 'I didn't do it but I'll see it doesn't happen again'."41
The judge's reply, or perhaps failure to reply, may show the need for further
investigation. In cases of serious misconduct and cases where a "Staff Inquiry Letter"
has not produced sufficient improvement in the judge's behavior, the investigation
sometimes leads to a formal fact-finding hearing. If as a result of the hearing the
Commission finds "good cause 42 to do so, it recommends to the Supreme Court the
censure or removal of the judge.
Until such a recommendation is made, all proceedings are confidential by law,
a policy designed to encourage judges who are conscious of guilt to resign or retire
voluntarily before the proceedings become public by virtue of a Commission recommendation for court action. In most cases where termination of service is warranted,
the judge resigns or retires fairly early in the proceedings, often even without a formal
CAL. P- CT. 904 (West 1970).
"Frankel, The Case for Judicial Disciplinary Measures, 49 J. Am. uJi. Soc'y 218,
42 CAL. R.CT.917 (Vest
1970).
40

221 (i966).

LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

hearing. As the Commission's Executive Secretary has pointed out: "If there is
proof of a situation serious enough to justify full proceedings, the significance and
gravity will often be apparent to the judge and his counsel and he may resign or
retire."4
In only two cases since 1961 has the Commission had a full proceeding and made
a recommendation to the Supreme Court. The Commission recommended in February 1964 that Judge Charles F. Stevens be removed for willful misconduct. In its
report accompanying the recommendation, the Commission found the judge guilty
of showing bias against the prosecution in criminal cases by dismissing cases for
trivial reasons and ridiculing and belittling law enforcement officers and other public
officers appearing for the prosecution. The Commission also found that the judge
had been evasive and untruthful in his testimony at the hearing, had once dismissed
a criminal case in which he appeared as the defendant's lawyer before becoming a
judge, and had allowed lawyers to practice before him who owed him money and
were representing him in a lawsuit. In a brief per curiam opinion, the Supreme
44
Court rejected the Commission's recommendation that Judge Stevens be removed.
o,pursuant to Commission recommendation, the court censured Judge
In June i97
Gerald S. Chargin4 5 for statements made by him at a juvenile hearing involving a
fifteen-year-old Mexican-American boy charged with incest. The Commission's
report found that the judge's statements were "insulting to the minor's family,
offensive to large segments of the public, and... [indicated] feelings and attitudes
of ethnic bias."
Several thoughtful constitutional provisions supplement the Commission's operations. On the theory that one whose fitness for judicial office has been brought seriously into question should not sit in judgment of others, California has provided
that a judge indicted for a felony or recommended by the Commission for removal
is automatically disqualified from acting in his official capacity.46 If an indicted judge
is convicted, the Supreme Court may suspend him; if the conviction becomes final,
the court must remove him.4 ' It is also provided that a judge removed from office
is thereafter ineligible for judicial office and is automatically suspended from
48
practicing law, pending further order of the court.
"Frankel, judicial Discipline and Removal-The California Plan, 58 ILL. B.J. 510 (970).
" Why the court rejected the Commission recommendation is not clear. Both the Executive Secretary
and the now retired appellate judge who was chairman of the Commission at the time have publicly speculated that the court may have felt judge Stevens deserved discipline rather than removal but did not
think it had this power. (Stevens was decided two years before the x966 constitutional amendment giving
the Supreme Court power to censure as well as remove. Compare CAL. CONsr. art. VI, § iob (x96o) tvith
id. § x8). See Frankel, Judicial Discipline and Removal, 44 T'EXAs L. REv. 1117, X129 (x966); Bray,
judging Judges-The California Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 33 NEV. S.B.J. 28, 31 (1968).
See also z965 REPORT OF Tmi CoMMisso

ON JuD:cIAL QUAmFicAIONs To THE GOVERNOR 3.

"il re Chargin, 2 Cal. 3 d 822, 471 P.2d 29 (1970), 87 Cal. Rptr. 709.
"7 CAL. CONSr. art. VI, § x8(a).
Id. § i8(b).
' I1d. § I8(d).
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V
In external appearance, the Illinois Courts Commission resembles the New York
Court on the Judiciary. Both are courts constituted specially to try cases of judicial
misconduct. Unlike the "special court" procedure, however, the Illinois Commission
has a permanent staff and agency continuity (the New York Court's members are
appointed on a case-by-case basis), which are characteristic features of those procedures modeled after California's Commission on Judicial Qualifications.
The Illinois Commission was created by constitutional amendment adopted in
November 1962 to take effect January i, 1964. The amendment provided:
[S]ubject to rules of procedure to be established by the Supreme Court and after
notice and hearing, any judge may be retired for disability or suspended without
pay or removed for cause by a commission composed of one judge of the Supreme
Court selected by that court, two judges of the Appellate Court selected by that
Court, and two circuit judges selected by the Supreme Court 4
Pursuant to this authority the Supreme Court promulgated in May 1964 its Rule 51,
establishing the Illinois Courts Commission and prescribing a procedure for the
Commission to receive, investigate, and hear complaints of judicial misconduct (and

disability).
The first request to convene the Commission arose from an incident in September
1964 involving Judge Wayne W. Olson of the Circuit Court of Cook County. Judge

Olson had been bound over to the grand jury on a charge of involuntary manslaughter as a result of the death of Lawrence Benner, who died from a skull fracture apparently caused by his head hitting the sidewalk during some sort of scuffle
that occurred outside a restaurant-cocktail lounge where he and Judge Olson had
been in conversation. When the case reached the grand jury in January 1965, the jury
voted no indictment; Chief Judge John S. Boyle thereupon requested the Supreme
Court to convene the Commission. Ten days later, the court announced it would
not do so, even though it did not "consider the conduct of Wayne W. Olson on the
evening in question appropriate to the position of a judge." The court cited insufficient evidence and the grand jury's failure to indict as the basis of its decision.
The Olson case made it manifest that the Commission itself had no practical
existence except at the pleasure of the Supreme Court. Under Rule 51 as originally
adopted in May 1964 and existing at the time of the Olson case, the Commission did
not sit permanently; rather, it was to be called into existence--"convened" in the
words of the rule--only when the Supreme Court found there was reason to do so.O
Clearly this arrangement gave the Commission itself no real power.
In late 1966, when the Supreme Court Rules Committee was finishing a complete
"ILL. CONsT. art. VI, § 18.
"oThe relevant part of the rule provided that complaints would be submitted to the Administrative
Office of the Illinois Courts. Then: "If the Supreme Court determines there is reason to convene the
commission, or upon request of the Senate, the Chief Justice shall order the commission to convene." 29
Ill. 2d at xv (x964) (emphasis added).
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revision of the court's rules, a suggestion was made that Rule 51 be amended to
provide that the Commission would sit on a permanent basis. The court refused
this suggestion. When the revised rules became effective January i, 1967, Rule 51
with minor language changes, remained identical in substance to its predecessor.
The Commission was actually convened for the first time three years after it was
established. The case began when a Chicago judge, Louis W. Kizas, released on
their own recognizance two men charged with robbing a Catholic church. Release
on a recognizance (no-cash) bond for a criminal suspect charged with a felony involving the use of a weapon-the robbers shot at a nun-is very unusual in Chicago.
When Chief Judge Boyle learned of the suspects' release, he decided to investigate
Judge Kizas' bond-writing practices further.
As a result of the investigation and pursuant to Chief Judge Boyle's request,
the Supreme Court convened the Commission May i8, 1967. The burden of the
complaint filed against Judge Kizas by the Attorney General a month later was that
the judge had "illegally taken and received sums of money for and in consideration
of his performance of official duties" and that he had "displayed total disregard for
the rules of the Circuit Court of Cook County [regarding setting bonds]." October 2
was set as the date for the Commission en banc to hear evidence on the merits.
On September 14, Judge Kizas, citing poor health, resigned.51
A second judge, James E. Murphy, was also charged with misconduct as a result
of Chief Judge Boyle's investigation of Chicago judges' bond-writing practices. At
a public hearing June 3, 1968, the Commission heard evidence on the charges against
Judge Murphy; a week later, it announced its decision finding the judge not guilty of
misconduct and dismissing the complaint.P2
A month after Judge Kizas' resignation, the Illinois State and Chicago Bar
Associations established the Joint Committee on the Illinois Courts Commission
"to study and made recommendations for the more effective use" of the Commission.
A year and seven meetings later, the committee petitioned the Supreme Court to
make certain amendments in Rule 51, which the court did, on June 27, 1969. The
most important change was that the Commission was convened on a permanent basis.
The Director of the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts was made "permanent Secretary" for the Commission and given the duty to receive and investigate
complaints; he was also authorized to make investigations on his own motion and
to hire investigators to assist him.
"1 This account of the case is based upon the official record, In re Kizas, M.R. 1174 (Ill- Cts. Comm'n
x964). Two years after his resignation, Kizas pleaded guilty to criminal charges of official misconduct
and was fined $I5,ooo, People v. Kizas, No. 68-2734 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill., Crim. Div., decided
Aug. 5, 1969). Three months later, on his own motion, his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys,
In re Kizas, Gen. No. 42503 (Ill. Sup. Ct., decided Nov. 25, 1969).
"In re Murphy, M.R. 1377 (II. Cts. Comm'n 1968). The principal charges against Judge Murphy
were that he set 7o2 bonds in a twenty-one month period; that he set bonds at places other than his regularly assigned place of duty and at times when bonds would normally have been issued by specifically designated courts; and that he set bonds in amounts higher than prescribed by court rule. Judge Murphy was
not charged, as Judge Kizas was, with accepting money to set bail.
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Six months later, Rule 51 was amended again. In the wake of the SolfisburgKlingbiel case (see Part I), the Supreme Court in September 1969 appointed a committee to draft a new code of judicial ethics and another committee to write rules of
procedure for hearings before the Commission. The procedural amendments to Rule
51 were effective January i, I97o; 53 the new code of ethics was adopted a month
later as Rules 61-7i.5
Rules 61-71 are divided into Standards of Judicial Conduct and Rules for the
Regulation of Judicial Conduct. The Standards are mostly normative exhortations:
A judge should ... (or should not). The Rules are mostly specific prohibitions
regarding problems that have been particularly troublesome, and not only in Illinois:
business activity, charitable solicitation, compensation for non-judicial services, political
activity, and financial and other conflicts of interests.
It is explicitly provided that violations of the Standards and Rules will subject the
55
offending judge to discipline by the Illinois Courts Commission, clearly a mandate

by the court for the Commission to assume responsibility for enforcement of the
new standards. Since the amendments to Rule 51 making the Commission a permanent agency with "full judicial power and authority" as well as full procedural
power, including the power to investigate and hear cases on its own motion, it has
the procedural means to carry out this mandate.
Thus invigorated, the Commission began in July 1969 to meet regularly each
month. During the ensuing eight-month period (through the end of February
197o), it received and investigated 121 complaints, fifteen of which were sufficiently
meritorious to be assigned Commission docket numbers and placed on the agenda
of business for further action 6 In one of these cases, which was decided July 14,
removed Cook County Circuit Court Judge Richard A.
1970, the Commission
7
Napolitano.5
VI
In evaluating various removal-discipline procedures, it is necessary to remember
that the general problem of judicial misconduct includes a range of particular problems, from corruption and major felonies at one extreme to tardiness and discourtesy at the other. To be effective, a procedure should be able to deal with all
-' The amendments effective January i, I97O, included these provisions: (a) in case of a hearing, formal
charges are to be served on the judge according to the rules for service of process in civil cases; (b) the
Commission is authorized to delegate to one of its members "such matters of preliminary determination
as it may deem desirable;" (c) the allegations of the complaint must be proved by "clear and convincing
evidence;" (d) the Commission was given the power to punish, by sanctions including contempt, "breaches
of order and unprofessional conduct."
""ILL. Sup'. CT. R. 61 to 71 (Smith-Hurd i97o).
"'id.,Rules 62, 71.
" Testimony of the Honorable Roy 0. Gulley, Directorof the Administrative Off ce of the Illinois Courts
and Secretary of the Illinois Courts Commission, Before the Judiciary Committee of the Illinois Constitutional Convention (Springfield, Feb. 24, 1970).
'TIn re Napolitano, M.R. 1324 (Ill. Cts. Comm'n 1970).
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these problems; that is, it should be capable of a range of dispositions, from informal
admonition5 s to formal public censure "9 and termination of service. To be efficient
as well, the procedure should be capable of operating reasonably expeditiously and
with minimum cost and public spectacle.
This research found that most actionable complaints of judicial misconduct call
for discipline rather than removal, and that in most cases where discipline is imposed, it is done confidentially (and often informally) rather than publicly. It also
appears, moreover, that where the decision agency is empowered only either to
remove or to acquit entirely-as in impeachment, for example-fewer complaints
are made, suggesting that the unavailability of a disciplinary sanction discourages
the reporting of less serious but nevertheless actionable misconduct, just those cases,
in other words, that constitute the bulk of the problem.
These findings suggest that the best procedures will be those most capable of
informal operation. The procedures that as a result of this research were judged to
have this capability have two characteristics in common: they have staff, and they
operate confidentially in preliminary proceedings.
Without staff, a removal-discipline agency has no practical existence. The staff
provides agency continuity and an identifiable, conveniently accessible presence in
the community; its responsibilities are to receive and screen complaints and make
preliminary investigations. Maintaining confidentiality in preliminary proceedings
serves several purposes. It protects judges from groundless accusations. It encourages
complaints from trial lawyers, who while they are in the best position to know
first-hand about some kinds of misconduct are sometimes reluctant to report it
because they believe that if they do their clients' interests will suffer. In those cases
where termination of service is warranted, confidentiality allows the judge to avoid
the time, expense, and spectacle of a public trial by resigning or retiring, a convenient
and desirable disposition from the agency's point of view also. Finally, in cases where
termination of service is not warranted, confidentiality facilitates discipline, since
contrition and co-operation from the judge are more likely if he is not made needlessly to suffer a public recitation of his professional or personal failings.
While staff and confidentiality are the procedural features that seem essential
to effective informal operations, there is one other feature that is very helpful-a
hearing agency. The hearing agency should be authorized to hold full-dress adversary
hearings and its proceedings should be confidential, an arrangement with several
advantages. It provides a calm atmosphere for fact-finding and the procedural
protections necessary to insure the respondent judge a fair hearing; it therefore
maximizes the likelihood that the judge will resign or retire if found guilty of
misconduct warranting removal.
" Admonition is used, for example, in California. See Frankel, Judicial Discipline and Removal, 44
TaxAs L. R

. 1117, 1131 (x966).

" Formal public censure is employed, for example, in New Jersey. See In re Pagliughi, 39 N.J. 517,
z89 A.2d 218 (1963); In re Hayden, 41 N.J. 443, 197 A.2d 353 (1964).
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In terms of these features-staff, confidentiality, and hearing agency-the pro-

cedures in the four studied have varying profiles. The New York Court on
the Judiciary does not recommend itself for imitation. Being ad hoc and without
staff, the Court has no continuity and is not conveniently accessible to potential complainants; furthermore, the requirement that the Chief Judge notify the governor and
legislature every time the Court is convened means that proceedings cannot be kept
confidential. Together these circumstances effectually incapacitate the Court from
acting informally, which explains, I think, why the Court has been convened only
three times since 1947 when it was created.
The procedures in New Jersey, California, and Illinois are similar in some
respects. All have staff-the state court administrator in New Jersey and Illinois, an
independent executive secretary in California. In all three states, proceedings are

confidential until a formal hearing before the decision agency. Functionally, too, the
procedures are similar, the operational objective in all three states being to resolve
actionable cases informally and confidentially if possible and to use the machinery
for formal proceedings only if absolutely necessary.
California is the only one of the three states with a separate hearing agencythe Commission on Judicial Qualifications. In addition to receiving, screening, and
investigating complaints, the Commission is also authorized to impose informal
discipline, such as oral admonition and written reprimand. Since in California, as
in the other states studied, most cases call for discipline rather than removal, the
Commission, besides being the hearing agency, is as a practical matter also the
decision agency in most cases.
New Jersey does not have a separate hearing agency, but the Supreme Court
sometimes uses the functionally similar device of appointing, on an ad hoc basis,
a judge as master or referee to take evidence, find the facts, and report to the court 60
The hearing judge is not authorized to impose discipline, however; in New Jersey,
unlike California, all discipline, formal and informal, is imposed by the Supreme
Court.
The Illinois Courts Commission does not have a separate hearing agency, but
because the Commission has been regularly active as a permanent agency only since
July 1969 it is too soon to say whether this is a serious limitation. The January
197 o amendments to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 51, which governs the Commission's procedure, included a provision that the Commission may delegate to one of
its members "such matters of preliminary determination as it may deem desirable."
Whether this means that one commissioner could serve as a hearing judge, to find
the facts and report them to the Commission, is problematic; it would seem he might
then be disqualified from sitting with the Commission en banc to rule on the merits.
The extent of the Commission's power to impose discipline confidentially is also
unclear. Rule 51 has always provided that any hearing in misconduct cases "shall be
' 0 See note 12a supra.
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public." Rule 71, however, adopted in February 197 o as part of the Standards and
Rules for the Regulation of Judicial Conduct, gives the Commission power to issue
reprimands "not of record." Since the imposition of discipline without a hearing
raises due process issues, the Commission may soon have either to amend the public
hearing requirement of Rule 51 or interpret it in such a way that it is consistent with
both due process and the power to impose discipline confidentially.
Which procedure is best? Evaluated on the basis of those features necessary to
maximize the capacity for informal disposition, the New Jersey and California procedures are equally effective. The Illinois Courts Commission, while it began inauspiciously in 1964 as a variation of the New York Court on the Judiciary, has
since evolved into a procedure much superior to its prototype and having features
of both the New Jersey and California procedures.

